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DEPRIVING AMERICA OF EVOLVING ITS OWN STANDARDS OF 
DECENCY?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF FOREIGN LAW IN 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS EFFECT ON 
DEMOCRACY 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court is no stranger to public scrutiny.  Decisions regarding 
hot-button social issues, such as the validity of school prayer and the presence 
of religious monuments on government property, have been widely discussed 
in the political realm because of differing opinions as to how the Establishment 
Clause1 should be interpreted.2  Similarly, abortion, gay rights, and affirmative 
action are all specific issues upon which the Court’s constitutional 
interpretations have received (and will continue to receive) significant public 
scrutiny.  In 2005, the Court addressed another controversial topic in Roper v. 
Simmons3—the death penalty. 
Typically, public responses to the Court’s decisions regarding the death 
penalty and other divisive issues have focused on the substance and outcome 
of these cases.  The general population tends to focus on the legal result of the 
cases rather than on the Court’s reasoning and methodology.  However, after 
the Court’s decision in Roper, the public showed an increased interest in one 
particular aspect of the Court’s process and methodology: the citation and 
influence of foreign law in interpreting the Constitution. 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 2. A number of recent Supreme Court cases have garnered particular attention in these and 
other areas.  See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (upholding an injunction 
barring displays of the Ten Commandments outside Kentucky courthouses due to their religious 
purposes); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that the inscription of the Ten 
Commandments on a monument at the Texas State Capital did not violate the Establishment 
Clause); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the juvenile death penalty is 
unconstitutional; discussed infra Part II.C.); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding 
that a Texas statute banning homosexual sodomy was unconstitutional due to the “emerging 
awareness” in society that liberty demands that adults be allowed to make personal decisions 
about their private sexual conduct); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that it is 
unconstitutional to execute the mentally retarded; discussed infra Part II.B.). 
 3. 543 U.S. 551. 
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The Supreme Court recently decided a number of cases which have 
discussed and cited foreign legal sources as authority for the majority opinion.4  
The citation of foreign law in these cases has led to a firestorm of debate and 
criticism about the role of these sources in constitutional law.5  In fact, Justices 
Scalia and Breyer recently met at American University for a public discussion 
of the relevance of foreign law in the Court’s decisions.6  More recently, the 
citation of foreign legal sources in constitutional decisions was a partial focus 
in the confirmation hearings of both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.7 
 
 4. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576–77; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21. 
 5. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Op-Ed., Innocence Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2005, at A25 
(discussing the controversy over the use of foreign law and opposing Chief Justice Roberts’s 
criticism of its use on the Court); Hadar Harris, “We Are the World”—Or Are We? The United 
States’ Conflicting Views on the Use of International Law and Foreign Legal Decisions, HUM. 
RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2005, at 5 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s use of foreign law is highly 
beneficial to furthering human rights in U.S. policy); Frank James, Gonzales Raps Justices for 
Citing Foreign Laws, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 2005, at 13 (discussing a speech by Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales explaining his opposition to the Supreme Court’s reliance on foreign law in 
recent cases); Felix G. Rohatyn, Op-Ed., Dead to the World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23 
(criticizing Justice Alito’s opposition to incorporating foreign law into the Court’s decisions); 
Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42 (exploring Justice Kennedy’s 
reasoning for invoking foreign sources). 
 6. Justice Antonin Scalia & Justice Stephen Breyer, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign 
Court Decisions, Discussion at American University Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005), 
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/ founders/2005/050113.cfm (scroll down for link 
to transcript). 
 7. During his confirmation hearings, Justice Alito discussed his opposition to the use of 
foreign sources in domestic Constitutional decisions: 
I don’t think that we should look to foreign law to interpret our own Constitution.  I 
agree . . . that the laws of the United States consist of the Constitution and treaties and 
laws, and I would add regulations that are promulgated in accordance with law.  And I 
don’t think that it’s appropriate or useful to look to foreign law in interpreting the 
provisions of our Constitution.  I think the Framers would be stunned by the idea that the 
Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by taking a poll of the countries of the world. 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
471 (2006) (testimony of Samuel A. Alito, nominee for Associate Justice of the Supreme Court). 
  Chief Justice Roberts relayed similar sentiments at his confirmation hearing: 
[R]elying on foreign precedent doesn’t confine judges.  It doesn’t limit their discretion the 
way relying on domestic precedent does.  Domestic precedent can confine and shape the 
discretion of the judges. 
  In foreign law you can find anything you want.  If you don’t find it in the decisions 
of France or Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia or wherever.  As 
somebody said in another context, looking at foreign law for support is like looking out 
over a crowd and picking out your friends.  You can find them, they’re there. . . . It allows 
the judge to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, cloak them with the 
authority of precedent because they’re finding precedent in foreign law, and use that to 
determine the meaning of the Constitution.  I think that’s a misuse of precedent, not a 
correct use of precedent. 
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Irrespective of the political overtones of much of the mainstream 
commentary on the use of foreign legal sources, there remains an important 
ongoing discussion about this practice in the legal field.8 The scholarly 
discussion focuses on the methodology and theory underlying judicial 
decision-making.9  Ultimately, the debate turns on whether foreign law has any 
bearing on the meaning of the United States Constitution, and whether its use 
has a detrimental effect on constitutional law and the integrity of the Court. 
One area where the use of foreign law has been particularly apparent is in 
recent Eighth Amendment cases, such as Roper v. Simmons10 and Atkins v. 
Virginia.11 This Comment argues that citing foreign law as authority for 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment12 undermines the American democratic 
process by curtailing the ability of American citizens to engage in a full 
discussion on the death penalty.13  As a result, the public itself is deprived of 
its function as a democratic unit that can shape and develop American law. 
It should be recognized at the outset that democratic discourse is limited to 
some extent any time the Court announces a rule of constitutional law.14  
However, the pre-emption of an issue in public discourse is different under 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence because the Supreme Court follows a 
standard whereby the Court looks to “the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society” as the measuring stick for what 
 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 201 (2005) (testimony of 
John G. Roberts, nominee for Chief Justice of the United States). 
 8. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303 
(2006) (arguing that foreign law should not be cited as authority in American constitutional 
decisions); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Judge, 9th Cir. Ct. App., What Role Should Foreign 
Practice and Precedent Play in the Interpretation of Domestic Law?, Speech at the Institute of 
Advanced Legal Studies of the University of London (Oct. 11, 2004), in 80 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1893 (2005) (suggesting that judges should recognize the usefulness of foreign law but 
noting that they should take a cautious approach when citing to it); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: 
A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 84–90 (2005) (suggesting that citation to foreign law is 
a shield for interjecting political judgments into the Court’s opinions). 
 9. See supra note 8. 
 10. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 11. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 13. Most criticism of the use of foreign law in Eighth Amendment cases seems to come from 
individuals who are also politically and morally sympathetic to the death penalty.  Insofar as this 
author personally finds the imposition of the death penalty morally repugnant, this Comment 
differs from many others.  This Comment does not attack the nature of the results produced by 
the Court’s decision, but rather the flawed methodology that achieved those results. 
 14. See WILLIAM J. QUIRK & R. RANDALL BRIDWELL, JUDICIAL DICTATORSHIP 8 (1995) 
(discussing Alexander Bickel’s view that “[t]he Court’s decision necessarily cuts off public 
debate and the possibility of achieving a democratic consensus.”). 
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constitutes “cruel and unusual” punishment.15  Because this standard takes into 
account society’s notion of civilized punishment, it requires the Court to 
consider the state of democratic progress on that issue.16  The standard itself 
requires a determination of the state of the ongoing discussion in the public 
sphere, as portrayed by the American people through their state legislatures.  
Therefore, the Court’s methodology under the Eighth Amendment deserves 
particularly close attention to ensure that the process of judicial action does not 
inadvertently damage democratic ideals. 
Part I begins with an explanation of democratic discourse as a 
“marketplace of ideas,” which is integral to the democratic republic.  The 
nature and workings of a functioning democracy are further considered in light 
of Jürgen Habermas’s work on the subject.  The role of the judiciary is 
considered in light of the nature of democracy and the intent of the Framers. 
Part II identifies and explains constitutional decisions that have developed 
the standard for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, primarily Trop v. Dulles,17 
Atkins v. Virginia,18 and Roper v. Simmons.19  The Court’s opinions in these 
cases elucidate the debate on the appropriate role of foreign law in interpreting 
the Eighth Amendment. 
Finally, Part III presents a discussion of the role of democracy in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence and the effect of foreign law on American society.  
First, the Court’s growing use of foreign law in Eighth Amendment decisions 
is examined in order to determine the magnitude of foreign law’s current 
effect.  Second, this Comment explains that the use of foreign law has a direct 
impact on democracy in that it prevents Americans from engaging in a full and 
thorough examination of what constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.”20  
This is largely because the importance of maintaining the democratic and truth-
revealing nature of the socio-political sphere in the United States is 
circumvented when these sources are used.  This Comment also considers 
potential responses by the three branches of government and the public and 
suggests which efforts can most effectively eliminate the use of foreign law in 
the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 
 
 15. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).   
 16. See id. at 99–100. 
 17. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 18. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 19. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
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I.  DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 
There is a justified concern that the Court’s use of foreign law as authority 
will negatively impact American democracy.  Judge Richard Posner of the 
Seventh Circuit expressed this concern, noting that international opinion is 
unrelated to our democratic institutions and has no rightful place in our 
jurisprudence: 
Judges in foreign countries do not have the slightest democratic legitimacy in a 
U.S. context.  The votes of foreign electorates, the judicial confirmation 
procedures (if any) in foreign nations, are not events in our democracy.  To cite 
foreign decisions in order to establish an international consensus that should 
have weight with U.S. courts is like subjecting legislation enacted by Congress 
to review by the United Nations General Assembly.21 
In order to appreciate the current and future impact that the use of foreign law 
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence can have on basic democratic principles, 
it is important to understand the underpinnings of democratic theory.  As 
discussed below, one of the more recent articulations of this theory comes not 
from American tradition, but rather from the writings of Jürgen Habermas.  
Though Habermas is German, his ideas about democracy are not foreign to 
American political or judicial tradition.  The following discussion provides an 
overview of this tradition, including a basic explanation of democratic theory 
from the viewpoints of many thinkers, culminating with Habermas’s position.  
These principles explicate the interplay between democratic ideals, the Eighth 
Amendment, and the role of the judiciary. 
A. Democracy and the “Marketplace of Ideas” 
The term “marketplace of ideas” has been used for centuries as a 
mechanism for explaining the manner in which a free and democratic society is 
able to arrive at truth.  Essentially, when citizens exercise speech rights, as 
under the First Amendment,22 society as a whole is able to gradually develop a 
truthful conception of any issue.23  The free exchange of ideas in the public 
sphere allows the citizenry to engage in an evolving discussion of principles 
until ultimately a unity of theory develops in such a way that the public at large 
can generally—if not unanimously—agree upon a course of action or policy.24  
 
 21. Posner, supra note 8, at 88–89. 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 23. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market . . . .”). 
 24. See id. 
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This is often the case with the development of moral values and social change 
within a community, whether at the local or national level.25 
Indeed, the Framers thought this principle of idea-exchange important 
enough that the United States Constitution guarantees a republican form of 
government to the states26 and preserves the citizens’ right to freedom of 
speech.27  The interplay is apparent: preservation of public speech is necessary 
to ensuring a republican form of government where citizens are able to voice 
their opinions to elected policy makers.28  Without this discourse, a republican 
form of government would lack the character of a democracy altogether.29  
Thus, the exchange of ideas in the “free market” is essential to the basic 
foundation of American constitutional law. 
John Locke30 thought it natural for political societies to form through the 
consent of individuals to be governed by the will of the majority.31  The 
function of this political society, under Locke’s theory, was to “unite for the 
mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates,” or in other words, to 
promote the common good.32  Although Locke did not propose a strictly 
 
 25. As noted by Jürgen Habermas, collective action against modern social problems—
including women’s rights, immigration, and poverty in the Third World—typically begins in the 
public sphere: 
Hardly any of these topics were initially brought up by exponents of the state apparatus, 
large organizations, or functional systems.  Instead, they were broached by intellectuals, 
concerned citizens, radical professionals, self-proclaimed “advocates,” and the like.  
Moving in from this outermost periphery, such issues force their way into newspapers and 
interested associations, clubs, professional organizations, academies, and universities.  
They find forums, citizen initiatives, and other platforms before they catalyze the growth 
of social movements and new subcultures. 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 381 (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 28. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 46–47 (James Madison) (Bantam ed. 1982) (explaining 
that in a republic, the public chooses representatives to whom the public views may be 
communicated). 
 29. See id. (noting the similarities and differences between a pure democracy and a 
republic). 
 30. John Locke (1632–1704) was an English political theorist and philosopher.  Peter 
Laslett, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 3, 16 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
 31. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 330–33 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1689). 
 32. Id. at 350 (emphasis in original). 
For being now in a new State, wherein he is to enjoy many Conveniences, from the 
labour, assistance, and society of others in the same Community, as well as protection 
from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty in providing 
for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the Society shall require. . . . 
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democratic form of political life, at least some of the Founders of our nation, 
such as Thomas Jefferson, were clearly influenced by Locke and recognized 
that the will of the majority was an integral component of a democratic 
society.33 
However, there remained a fear that the majority could turn tyrannous and 
bend the people to its will.34  Noting that there will always be factions in 
democratic governance that seek to impose their will on the populace, James 
Madison wrote: 
It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these 
clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good.  
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm: Nor, in many cases, can 
such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and 
remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest 
which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of 
the whole.35 
Thus, the Federalists promoted the notion of a republican form of government 
instead of a pure democracy in order to ensure that the people would enjoy 
democratic decision-making power, while also guarding against the tyranny of 
the majority.36  According to Madison, the effect of a republic is to “refine and 
enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen 
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their 
country.”37 
Essentially, the Founders aimed to create a democratic republic wherein 
the citizens would be able to discuss policies and issues and collectively 
determine the best course of action.38 Recognizing the potential for 
manipulation and abuse by a majority of self-interested citizens, Madison and 
the Federalists proposed a system of government wherein representatives 
would be seated to determine the course of the discussion among their 
constituents and speak on their behalf.39  This view includes the notion of “the 
 
Id. at 353. 
 33. See Laslett, supra note 30, at 15 (noting the “coincidence” between Locke’s work and 
The Declaration of Independence, though suggesting that Locke’s influence on the Founders has 
been overstated). 
 34. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 28. 
 35. Id. at 45. 
 36. See id. at 45–48 (describing the similarities and differences between a pure democracy 
and republic). 
 37. Id. at 46–47. 
 38. See id. at 46–47 (describing the ability of the public to elect representatives to whom 
their interests and concerns may be voiced for consideration in the governmental decision-making 
process). 
 39. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 28, at 46–47 (describing the 
possibility of oppression in a pure democracy and how a democratic republic can improve that 
process). 
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marketplace of ideas,” wherein the citizens gather in the public sphere to 
develop issues in order to come to a clearer understanding of the validity and 
prudence of such matters. 
The maintenance of this free market of ideas was further expounded upon 
in the writings of the English philosopher John Stuart Mill,40 who explained 
the necessity of ongoing discussion for the pursuit of truth and proper 
governance: “We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to 
stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.”41  
Mill argued that the opponents of an idea cannot morally justify muting 
argument on a topic, because doing so essentially decides the question for 
everyone.42 
Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very 
condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on 
no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of 
being right.43 
Thus, Mill argues that the majority can be tyrannical and states that free 
discussion of ideas in the public sphere can only lead to human development if 
it is not smothered by the powerful.44  Accordingly, dissenters should not be 
quieted, but instead encouraged to raise their views, although unpopular, in 
open debate with their opponents.45  The discussion remains vibrant in this 
way, and the risk of majority error is rectifiable because in the face of social 
error, an argument by those in dissent has the opportunity to advance and lead 
toward truth.46 
In America, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes echoed Mill’s sentiments in 
his famous dissent from Abrams v. United States: 
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
wishes safely can be carried out.47 
Likewise, Justice Brandeis further expounded upon the truth-finding principle 
of democracy in his concurrence for Whitney v. California: 
 
 40. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was an English philosopher and developer of 
Utilitarianism.  Elizabeth Rapaport, Introduction to JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY vii, viii 
(Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g 1978) (1859). 
 41. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g 1978) 
(1859). 
 42. Id. at 16–17.  “All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility.”  Id. at 17. 
 43. Id. at 18. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. MILL, supra note 41, at 18. 
 47. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was 
to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the 
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. . . . They believed that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable 
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and 
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords 
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; 
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is 
a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government. . . . Believing in the power of reason as applied through 
public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of 
force in its worst form.48 
An underlying ideal of democratic governance, which the judiciary must 
protect, is that society at large must be allowed to engage in a discussion of 
matters unfettered by the will of the powerful. 
If ever a society is to arrive at actual truth, speech and participation in 
social discourse must be encouraged and permitted the opportunity to flourish.  
Dissenters ought not be silenced, because doing so creates the risk that actual 
truth will be buried in self-righteous certainty.  To be sure, majority rule is 
necessary for effective governance; but in order for the nation to remain 
successful in the implementation of responsible policy decisions, the majority 
must not exert its will so as to quash the conversation at large. 
B. Habermas’s View of Democratic Functionality in the Public Sphere 
Despite the use of democracy as a mechanism for truth, the problem exists 
that deliberations in the public sphere are often curtailed by majority rule.49  
Jürgen Habermas50 advanced an explanation for this phenomenon in his work 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.51  Although Habermas is 
German, his critique of this truth-finding process is supported by history and is 
in keeping with the American understanding of democracy.  Essentially, 
Habermas argues that when all persons who are capable of rational discussion 
are invited into the public sphere, issues are widely examined by people of all 
backgrounds and viewpoints, and the decision-making process grows as a 
function of this participation.52 This relates to Habermas’s theory of 
 
 48. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 49. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
 50. Jürgen Habermas (1929–  ) is a German critical theorist and philosopher.  Patrick Baert, 
Jürgen Habermas, in PROFILES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 84–86 (Anthony Elliot & 
Bryan S. Turner eds., 2001). 
 51. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN 
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., MIT Press 1991) 
(1962). 
 52. See id. at 3–4. 
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communicative action, whereby individuals in a society communicate verbally 
to share and debate ideas, which will be either disregarded or institutionalized 
into society depending on social agreement as to the rightness or wrongness of 
those ideas.53  It is in this manner that a democratic society is able to pursue 
truth in the public sphere, a necessity for efficient and effective government by 
the people. 
Habermas relates the success (and decline) of democratic systems through 
history in an effort to explain how they function. Habermas’s historical 
account notes that democracy as it existed in Ancient Greece has been the 
general model for modern Western society.54  In the Hellenic democracy, free 
citizens engaged directly with one another in the public sphere to better 
achieve an understanding of truth in the community.55 There, topics and 
conflicts became thematized56 as they were raised by the populace, and the 
honorable practice of debate over issues ultimately resulted in the resolution of 
such problems.57  Arguments continued to develop until an argument emerged 
with such weight and clarity that its truth could not be denied: 
Only in the light of the public sphere did that which existed become revealed, 
did everything become visible to all.  In the discussion among citizens issues 
were made topical and took on shape.  In the competition among equals the 
best excelled and gained their essence—the immortality of fame.58 
According to Habermas, the public sphere was largely diminished under 
feudalism, as the King and his administrators—as well as the Church—made 
decisions on the people’s behalf.59  However, the emergence of capitalism over 
time tended to re-open the public sphere due to the necessity of open 
communication for the purpose of trade in the port cities.60 As industrial 
societies developed more fully, the need for the exchange of information 
 
 53. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION VOLUME 2—SYSTEM 
AND LIFEWORLD: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 119–27 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 
Beacon Press 1987); see Mathieu Deflem, Introduction: Law in Habermas’s Theory of 
Communicative Action, in HABERMAS, MODERNITY AND LAW 1, 3–4 (Mathieu Deflem ed., 
1996). 
 54. HABERMAS, supra note 51, at 4.  “Since the Renaissance this model of the Hellenic 
public sphere, as handed down to us in the stylized form of Greek self-interpretation, has shared 
with everything else considered ‘classical’ a peculiarly normative power.  Not the social 
formation at its base but the ideological template itself has preserved continuity over the 
centuries—on the level of intellectual history.”  Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. The term “thematized” is used here to refer to the process of bringing issues and topics 
into public discussion for analysis and examination. 
 57. HABERMAS, supra note 51, at 4. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 7–10. 
 60. Id. at 14–18. 
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between individuals became more pronounced, further increasing the 
participation of citizens in the public sphere.61 
As the public sphere grew, the discourse naturally grew beyond matters of 
trade and came to involve political issues, whereby the legal landscape 
gradually came to sanction the public as a collective participant in the political 
sphere.62  The continued development of social structures and political rights 
ultimately allowed further growth of the public sphere so that discourse within 
the socio-political environment acquired a real possibility of creating a 
consensus upon which effective policy measures were taken.63 
Habermas’s insight is that when discussion can continue unhindered in the 
public sphere in a more or less transparent and uninterrupted manner, society 
has the ability over time to develop that dialogue into a realization of truth or 
something very close to it: “The public sphere of civil society stood or fell with 
the principle of universal access.  A public sphere from which specific groups 
would be eo ipso excluded was less than merely incomplete; it was not a public 
sphere at all.”64  In other words, with broad participation and a variety of 
viewpoints, it is more likely that an argument will develop that encompasses 
all facets of social reality.65  Such an argument incorporates dynamic principles 
of truth and justice, and therefore has great social import.66  In this author’s 
estimation, it is because of this truth elucidation mechanism that representative 
government is a viable political option.  With an open dialogue in which all 
citizens are capable of participating, the citizenry effectively elects those who 
can best relay its collective policy determinations to the nation-state and 
implement what, at least on a local level, becomes a consensus. 
In order to truly reflect Habermasian theory, it should be noted that while 
Habermas remains a strong believer in democracy, his view of the modern 
world is not one of utopian naïveté.  Habermas does not seem to believe that 
the public sphere fully continues to operate in an open and democratic fashion 
in the modern world.67  For Habermas, free and open discussion has been 
replaced, at least to some extent, with mass media, which tends to dictate to the 
public rather than to engage members of the community in a political 
discussion.68  According to Habermas, political news is watered down, and the 
public at large is distracted in the commercial media with sports and 
 
 61. Id. at 57–59. 
 62. See HABERMAS, supra note 51, at 83 (discussing the development of constitutional states 
wherein certain rights became guaranteed, thereby ensuring the existence and vitality of the 
public sphere as a quasi-political entity). 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. at 85. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See HABERMAS, supra note 51, at 159–75, 211–22. 
 68. Id. at 163–65, 168–69. 
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entertainment.69  In essence, Habermas’s insight derives in part from the fact 
that communication has become a business wherein parties generally purchase 
a one-way dialogue, rarely engage in public discussion, and are bombarded 
with advertisements.70  Instead of open discourse in the public sphere, political 
debate occurs mainly among family and friends, where participants “have a 
tendency to do no more than mutually confirm their ideas and at best to 
influence only the hesitant and less involved parties.”71 
As explained by Mathiu Deflem, Habermas’s theory is that money and 
power steer at least some levels of democratic society, and interpersonal 
democracy is incapable of driving social progress alone: 
[Money and power] relieve communicative action from difficulties in reaching 
consensus in complex societies characterized by a range of action alternatives 
and, therefore, a constant threat of dissent.  Actions coordinated by the steering 
media of money and power differ from communicative action in that they aim 
at the successful . . . organization of the production and exchange of goods on 
the basis of monetary profit (economy) and the formation of government to 
reach binding decisions in terms of bureaucratic efficiency (politics).72 
Law provides a basis for institutionalizing the roles of money and power by 
providing legal norms that can be governmentally enforced, while democracy, 
though it continues, operates among smaller subsets of society.73  Instead of a 
purely democratic public sphere as a means for uncovering truths for 
humankind, society is directed on the one hand toward personal subjective 
understandings of morality and personal identity, and toward the efficiency of 
government bureaucracies through agreed upon legal mandates on the other 
hand.74 
While Habermas’s analysis reveals troubling tendencies in modern 
democratic functionality, he does not believe that rational public deliberation 
has ceased altogether.  Although modern political news seems to involve 
consumptive qualities and is at times dictated to the public, there remains in 
modern society the character of democratic deliberation.75  The democratic 
 
 69. Id. at 169–70. 
 70. Id. at 164, 175–77. 
 71. Id. at 213. 
 72. Deflem, supra note 53, at 4–5. 
 73. HABERMAS, supra note 53, at 164–79; see Deflem, supra note 53, at 5–6.  Habermas 
does not deny that values cannot be developed and shared by those with moral influence in the 
community, but he does note that such action typically is not dominant in the modern public 
sphere “where the influence of journalists, party leaders, intellectuals, artists, and the like is of 
primary importance.”  HABERMAS, supra note 53, at 275; see also id. at 264–82. 
 74. HABERMAS, supra note 53, at 164–79; see Deflem, supra note 53, at 6. 
 75. For instance, the public’s engagement of political and social issues continues to occur on 
a regular basis via discussions in the workplace and schools, as well as through public 
demonstrations in cities across the country.  See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA: 2004 ANNUAL 
REPORT 3 (2004), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/about/aiusa_annualreport.pdf  
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nature of American society suffers to the extent that public discussion and 
engagement of the issues in open forums appears to be shrinking, but that 
democratic nature of the republic persists nonetheless.  What Habermas 
describes is a taint on an efficient and robust democracy.  But a tainted 
democracy is not a rotten democracy.  It would be a mistake to ignore other 
factors contributing to a diminished public discourse simply because of this 
trend.  Habermas himself notes that “the players in the arena owe their 
influence to the approval of those in the gallery.”76  As a result, the democratic 
notions provided by Habermas are used in this Comment as a framework to 
support the claim that the use of foreign law in current Eighth Amendment 
decisions undermines the democratic nature of American political life. 
C. The Role of the Judiciary 
Unlike the Legislative and Executive Branches of government, 
participation in the Judiciary is an attenuated function of democratic society.  
Citizens have only minimal participation in the selection of federal judges, 
insofar as judicial philosophy and methodology may play minor roles in 
determining which presidential candidates receive votes.77  That is, knowing 
that the executive will make determinations about what kind of judges will be 
 
(explaining the national involvement of over 330,000 individuals and nearly 200,000 student 
groups in its human rights activism and awareness programs); Michelle Boorstein, Protestors See 
Mood Shift Against ‘Roe’, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2006, at A3 (reporting on an early-2006 pro-life 
protest in Washington, D.C. attended by thousands); Darryl Fears & Krissah Williams, Immigrant 
Rallies Have Mixed Impact, WASH. POST, May 7, 2006, at A3 (discussing opposition to illegal 
immigration in response to large rallies in support of immigrants); Evelyn Nieves, Groups 
Preparing New Push Against Iraq War; Invasion Anniversary Next Month is Date of Campaign 
Kickoff, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2005, at A3 (discussing the growing protest activity of citizens 
opposed to U.S. military activity in Iraq); Antonio Olivo & Oscar Avila, United They March: 
Hundreds of Thousands Rally for Immigration Rights, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2006, at C1 (describing 
collective action of protestors in Chicago and other U.S. cities in support of immigrant concerns); 
Robert Pear, Rally Near White House Protests Violence in Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2006, 
at 22 (recounting a large protest in Washington, D.C. against American support for Israeli 
military operations in Lebanon); Robin Tower, A Gay Rights Rally Over Gains and Goals, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 1, 2000, at A14 (reporting on the efforts of activists to promote awareness of gay 
rights issues and to work toward the advancement of homosexuals in America).  Moreover, the 
engagement of American citizens in the political process as voters has remained steady, if not 
increasing in recent years.  See generally Michael P. McDonald & Samuel L. Popkin, The Myth of 
the Vanishing Voter, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 963 (2001) (presenting data indicating that the 
turnout of eligible voters has fluctuated since the 1970s but has not decreased); see also Juan 
Salgado, Letter to the Editor, Voter Registration Increase, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at 38 
(celebrating the growing desire of Chicago’s immigrant population to participate in the political 
process). 
 76. HABERMAS, supra note 25, at 382. 
 77. See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 139 (1991) (noting that if Court decisions prove unpopular, elections 
may be influenced by the potential for Supreme Court appointments). 
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appointed, the public accounts for the Judicial Branch to some extent when 
casting its votes for President at the ballot box.78  However, it seems unlikely 
that many citizens are overly concerned with judicial appointments in anything 
other than the immediate.  Thus, if the Judiciary is to have any democratic 
function, it must be in the protection of the underlying principles that ensure 
democratic vitality in the public sphere.  In this way, the role of the Judicial 
Branch serves an important democratic principle. 
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay 
what the law is.”79  The thrust of this oft-quoted statement embodies concepts 
central to the role of the Court.  First, the Court is the ultimate authority of 
constitutional claims, beyond which there is no judicial appeal.80  Thus, the 
force of an opinion by the Supreme Court generally determines the course of 
constitutional law on a specific issue for years to come.81 Second, the 
statement, when considered in light of the Supremacy Clause,82 includes an 
implicit and logical assertion that the Court is expounding the law of America.  
In other words, the Court determines the state of American law, derived from 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.”); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam ed. 1982) (“That 
there ought to be one court of supreme and final jurisdiction is a proposition which has not been, 
and is not likely to be contested.”). 
 81. Of course, it is possible that Congress can overturn the Court’s decisions via 
constitutional amendments: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds 
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either 
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified 
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress . . . . 
U.S. CONST. art. V.  Likewise, under certain circumstances, Congress has the power to impeach 
and remove Supreme Court Justices.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and 
all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”). However, 
amendments are rare—only four times has Congress amended the Constitution in order to alter a 
Supreme Court decision.  See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process 
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 776 (1991).  Additionally, Justice Samuel Chase, the only Supreme 
Court Justice to have ever been impeached, was neither convicted of any crime nor removed from 
office. Steven W. Fitschen, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Covenantal and Constitutional 
Response to Judicial Tyranny, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 111, 139 (1998). 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
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the Constitution and American traditions, and ultimately, the American people, 
in the form of statutory law.83 
Chief Justice John Marshall recognized this limitation on government and 
the Court in 1812 when discerning the limits of American legal power over 
other nations: 
  The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the 
nation as an independent sovereign power.  The jurisdiction of the nation, 
within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible 
of no limitation, not imposed by itself.  Any restriction upon it, deriving 
validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty, 
to the extent, of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty, to the 
same extent, in that power which could impose such restriction.  All 
exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own 
territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself.  They can flow 
from no other legitimate source.  
  This consent may be either express or implied.  In the latter case, it is less 
determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of construction; but, if 
understood, not less obligatory.84 
While Chief Justice Marshall was referring to the limits on the exercise of 
American power over other nations, the logic of the rule is reciprocal.  It is an 
illegitimate exercise of government to permit foreign influence over the laws 
and practices of the American court system because the exercise of foreign 
authority does not arise from popular consent. 
Indeed, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Atkins v. 
Virginia, it is the legislature that must respond to the will and morality of the 
public.85  The Court should, as much as possible, ensure that its decisions do 
not “cut off the normal democratic processes.”86 Likewise, Alexander 
Hamilton noted the derivation of the Constitution from the American people 
and the importance of the preservation of that democratic will in The 
Federalist No. 78: 
[This conclusion] only supposes that the power of the people is superior to 
both [the judicial and legislative powers]; and that where the will of the 
legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people 
 
 83. The Framers indicated that the Court ought to defer to the will of the people: 
It can be of no weight to say, that the courts on the pretence of a repugnancy, may 
substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature. . . . The 
courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL 
instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure 
to that of the legislative body. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam ed. 1982). 
 84. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812). 
 85. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. 
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declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter, 
rather than the former.87 
In the interest of ensuring the preservation of the democratic process, the 
Court’s role should be confined to determining the law for Americans insofar 
as Americans have constructed that law—whether it be from the Framers’ 
original intent, through constitutional amendment, statutory authority, or 
through narrow judicially-created precedent tailored to take American mores 
and practices into account. As Justice Scalia warned in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, “We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States 
of America that we are expounding.”88 
A logical conclusion from this reasoning, therefore, is that when 
consensus-based precedents for determining the meaning of the Constitution 
are employed, such as in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court must 
ensure that its decisions preserve the democratic function of the citizenry to 
whatever extent possible.  In order to understand how democratic ideals can 
best be considered and promoted by the Court, it is important to analyze the 
methods from which such interpretations are derived.  Part II provides an 
overview of the Court’s recent methodology with regard to the Eighth 
Amendment. 
II.  THE DISPUTE OVER FOREIGN LAW IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASES 
In light of the philosophical and political thought that created and shaped 
American democracy, constitutional case law has led and defined the recent 
increase in debate over the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation.89  
Specifically, the Eighth Amendment is directly linked to democratic principles 
by the Court’s invocation of a standard that requires an analysis of the state of 
social discourse as to what constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.”90  
Increasingly, the Supreme Court has considered and cited foreign law as a 
source of authority in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.91  The following 
discussion provides a brief overview of the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
standard and the recent increase in the use of foreign decisions in its analysis. 
A. Trop v. Dulles and the “Evolving Standards of Decency” 
Trop v. Dulles92 set the standard by which “cruel and unusual punishment” 
is examined by the Supreme Court.  In Trop, the Court was asked to rule on the 
 
 87. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 83, at 395–96. 
 88. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 89. See, e.g., supra notes 4–5. 
 90. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 
 91. See generally infra Part II. 
 92. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
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constitutionality of a section of the Nationality Act of 194093 that imposed loss 
of citizenship as punishment for desertion by a soldier during wartime.94  
Albert Trop, a soldier stationed in Morocco during World War II, escaped 
from a stockade where he had been confined for misconduct.95  Trop was later 
apprehended, court-martialed, convicted of desertion, and dishonorably 
discharged.96  His conviction also required a revocation of his citizenship 
under the Nationality Act.97  In an attempt to retain his citizenship, Trop sued 
the U.S. government.98 
One question before the Court was whether the revocation of a soldier’s 
citizenship for Army desertion constituted cruel and unusual punishment 
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.99  Writing for a 5-4 majority, 
Chief Justice Warren stated that the Eighth Amendment guarantees that a 
citizen’s punishment will be governed “by the principle of civilized 
treatment”100 and embodies the basic principle that the government must 
respect the dignity of persons by punishing criminals according to civilized 
standards.101  Ultimately, the Court determined that “The [Eighth] Amendment 
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”102  Within this framework, the Court held that 
the revocation of citizenship for desertion constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.103 
 
 93. 54 Stat. 1137, 1168–69 (1940), amended by 58 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1481(a)(8) (1952)). 
(a) From and after the effective date of this chapter a person who is a national of the 
United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by—  
. . . 
(8) deserting the military, air, or naval forces of the United States in time of war, if and 
when he is convicted thereof by court martial and as the result of such conviction is 
dismissed or dishonorably discharged from the service of such military, air, or naval 
forces: Provided, That, notwithstanding loss of nationality or citizenship under the terms 
of this chapter or previous laws by reason of desertion committed in time of war, 
restoration to active duty with such military, air, or naval forces in time of war or the 
reenlistment or induction of such a person in time of war with permission of competent 
military, air, or naval authority shall be deemed to have the immediate effect of restoring 
such nationality or citizenship heretofore or hereafter so lost . . . . 
Id. 
 94. Trop, 356 U.S. at 87. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 88. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 100. 
 102. Id. at 101. 
 103. Id. 
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In making this determination, the Court looked to the nature of the 
punishment and the nature of the political structure within which human beings 
live.104  Interestingly, the Court briefly noted within the actual text of the 
opinion that only two other nations in the world imposed denationalization as a 
punishment for military desertion.105  It is not clear to what extent the Court 
relied upon this fact to determine whether the Nationality Act comported with 
the “evolving standards of decency . . . of a maturing society,” although it 
appears that it had a “confirmatory role” in the Court’s analysis.106  
Nonetheless, the presence of foreign law in Trop is noteworthy in that future 
cases mirrored the format. 
Interestingly, the dissenting opinion in Trop made no criticism of the 
majority’s use of foreign law whatsoever.107  In fact, Justice Frankfurter’s 
dissent actually invoked the use of foreign law to support his own position.108  
If nothing else, the Court’s use of foreign law in Trop opened the door for its 
citation in future opinions.  Ultimately, however, the repeated citation of 
foreign sources in the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment has created an 
ongoing disagreement between various Justices on its relevance to 
constitutional interpretation. 
B. The Road to Roper v. Simmons 
After Trop set the standard by which “cruel and unusual punishment” 
would be determined in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court decided a 
string of opinions over the next half-century that primarily relied on domestic 
law and changes in American society.109  Nonetheless, the Court’s continued 
invocation of foreign legal sources as a point of reference for constitutional 
interpretation is apparent in these cases. 
For instance, in 1977, the Court held in Coker v. Georgia110 that the death 
penalty could not be instituted as a punishment for rape because this practice 
was proscribed by the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against “cruel and 
unusual punishment.”111 There, the Court primarily focused on the 
proportionality of the offense to the punishment and the small number of states 
that allowed the death penalty for the offense of rape.112  However, the Court 
 
 104. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101–03. 
 105. Id. at 103.  These nations were the Philippines and Turkey.  Id. 
 106. Id. at 101. 
 107. See id. at 114–28 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 108. Id. at 126. 
 109. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 
(1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 110. 433 U.S. 584. 
 111. Id. at 592. 
 112. Id. at 593. 
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briefly appealed to foreign law and international opinion in a short footnote, 
stating that only three major nations allowed the death penalty for rape.113  In 
fact, the Court explicitly stated that international opinion was “not irrelevant” 
in determining the civility of the punishment under the Eighth Amendment.114 
Likewise, in 1982, the Court limited its use of foreign law to a footnote in 
Enmund v. Florida,115 where the Court held that the imposition of felony 
murder did not comport with the standards of the Eighth Amendment, absent a 
specific finding that the defendant intended to kill.116  Pointing to such nations 
as Canada, England, and India, the Court noted that its decision in Enmund 
was consistent with the views of the world community.117 
Foreign views on Eighth Amendment issues did not resurface in the actual 
text of a Supreme Court opinion until 1988 when Thompson v. Oklahoma118 
was decided.  In Thompson, the Court found that the imposition of the death 
penalty against murderers under the age of sixteen was inconsistent with the 
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”119  Writing for a 5-3 majority,120 Justice Stevens stated that this 
holding was “consistent with the views that have been expressed by . . . other 
nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members 
of the Western European community.”121  To further support the Court’s 
holding, Justice Stevens then listed multiple nations that had either restricted 
the use of the death penalty to adults or banned the death penalty entirely.122 
For the first time, Thompson also included a short reproach of the 
majority’s use of foreign law, albeit only in a footnote.123  In dissent, Justice 
Scalia argued that foreign law is an inappropriate tool for determining the 
 
 113. Id. at 596 n.10.  As in Trop v. Dulles, the dissent in Coker made no objection to the use 
of foreign sources.  Id. at 604–22 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 596 n.10 (majority opinion). 
 115. 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982). 
 116. Id. at 782. 
 117. Id. at 796 n.22.  Yet again, the dissent made no criticism of the majority’s use of foreign 
law in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Id. at 801–31 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 118. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 119. Id. at 821–23. 
 120. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the opinion.  Id. at 815. 
 121. Id. at 830. 
 122. Id. at 830–31. 
Although the death penalty has not been entirely abolished in the United Kingdom or New 
Zealand (it has been abolished in Australia, except in the State of New South Wales, 
where it is available for treason and piracy), in neither of those countries may a juvenile 
be executed.  The death penalty has been abolished in West Germany, France, Portugal, 
the Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries, and is available only for 
exceptional crimes such as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland.  Juvenile 
executions are also prohibited in the Soviet Union. 
Id. 
 123. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868–69 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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meaning of the U.S. Constitution and that domestic law is determinative in 
constitutional decisions, 
even if that position contradicts the uniform view of the rest of the world.  We 
must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that 
we are expounding. . . . [W]here there is not first a settled consensus among 
our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices 
of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans 
through the Constitution.124 
After his dissent in Thompson, Justice Scalia became the most vocal critic 
of the use of foreign law in constitutional decision-making.125 This 
characteristic became apparent in Stanford v. Kentucky, where Justice Scalia 
wrote for the majority in a 5-4 opinion declaring that the execution of sixteen- 
and seventeen-year-old murderers did not violate the Eighth Amendment.126  
While Justice Scalia did not attack the use of foreign sources directly in the 
actual text of the opinion, in discussing the application of the Trop standard, he 
asserted that the Court must look to the conceptions of decency held by 
modern American society.127  Nonetheless, his opposition to the use of foreign 
materials was again made clear in a footnote: 
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, 
rejecting the contention of petitioners . . . that the sentencing practices of other 
countries are relevant. . . . “[T]he practices of other nations” . . . cannot serve 
to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is 
accepted among our people.128 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Justice Scalia’s view of the issue pertains not only to Eighth Amendment decisions, but 
also to any citation of foreign law when interpreting the meaning of the Constitution.  See, e.g., 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that new 
constitutional rights do not suddenly appear in the Constitution simply because foreign countries 
have felt differently about the issue and calling the majority’s use of foreign law “meaningless” 
and “dangerous”); see also Antonin Scalia, Commentary at the Conference of Supreme Courts of 
the Americas (Oct. 1995), in 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1119, 1121 (1996) (arguing that foreign 
and international law is to be cited by the Court only where the “customary usages of 
international affairs” are involved, and those usages do not contradict American law); Scalia & 
Breyer, supra note 6 (where Justice Scalia criticized the use of foreign law as a mechanism for 
manipulation whereby judges can impose their personal beliefs on the nation by appealing to 
whatever sources agree with them). 
 126. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 127. Id. at 369. 
 128. Id. at 369 n.1 (emphasis in original, citation omitted).  Interestingly, Justice Kennedy 
joined Justice Scalia’s opinion, despite the fact that he would become one of the most outspoken 
advocates of using foreign law after writing the opinions in both Lawrence v. Texas and Roper v. 
Simmons.  See Toobin, supra note 5 (examining Justice Kennedy’s interest in foreign law and the 
backlash he has received for citing it in his opinions). 
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While Justice Scalia denounced the use of foreign law, the citation of 
which had gone uncontested until Thompson, Justice Brennan’s dissent 
attacked the position of the majority on this issue.129  Noting that a number of 
previous Eighth Amendment cases looked beyond American borders, the 
dissent relayed statistics in support of the assertion that the world community 
rejected the use of the death penalty for crimes committed by juvenile 
offenders.130 
The debate became more pronounced in 2002 with Atkins v. Virginia, 
where the Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred the execution of the 
mentally retarded.131  Once again, the majority confined its use of foreign and 
international opinion to a footnote, rather than including it in the text of the 
opinion.132  Although conceding that global opinion was not dispositive, the 
majority stated that the world’s overwhelming disapproval of imposing the 
death penalty on the mentally retarded bolstered support for the Court’s 
holding.133 
Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia wrote dissenting opinions 
that attacked the majority’s invocation of international sources.134  The Chief 
Justice noted that the Court had denounced the use of these sources in 
Stanford, writing: “I fail to see . . . how the views of other countries regarding 
the punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court’s ultimate 
determination. . . . For if it is evidence of a national consensus for which we 
are looking, then the viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant.”135  
Justice Scalia reiterated this sentiment, suggesting that the majority had 
fabricated a national consensus in part through its use of foreign law.136  
“[I]rrelevant are the practices of the ‘world community,’ whose notions of 
justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.”137 
C. The Expansion of Foreign Influence in Roper v. Simmons 
Although the use of foreign law in Eighth Amendment decisions started 
quietly in Trop, the division on the Court became clearer when Justice 
Kennedy invoked foreign legal sources as authority for the majority opinion in 
Roper v. Simmons.138  Justice Kennedy’s discussion in Roper represents the 
 
 129. Stanford, 492 U.S at 382–405 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 389–90. 
 131. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 132. Id. at 316 n.21. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 321–28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 337–54 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 324–25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 136. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 347–48. 
 138. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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most extensive and pronounced use of foreign sources in the actual text of any 
Eighth Amendment decision. 
In Roper, the defendant, Christopher Simmons, was seventeen years old 
when he and two cohorts planned and committed burglary and a gruesome 
murder.139  While planning the crime, Simmons told his friends that they 
would be able to get away with the crime due to their age.140  At trial, 
Simmons was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.141 On state 
collateral appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court agreed with Simmons that the 
Eighth Amendment bars the imposition of a death sentence against a juvenile 
murderer.142 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case and 
affirmed the Missouri decision in Roper v. Simmons.143  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Kennedy argued under the Trop rule that the standards of 
decency in society had evolved so as to make the implementation of the death 
penalty against minors cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.144  
While engaging in this process, the Court focused primarily on a perceived 
consistent movement among the states away from the use of the juvenile death 
penalty.145 
However, the Court did not limit its efforts to the practices of the states.  
Justice Kennedy specifically set aside a separate discussion in its own section 
of the opinion to argue that the unconstitutionality of the juvenile death penalty 
was confirmed by “the stark reality that the United States is the only country in 
the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death 
penalty.”146  By contrasting the practices and standards of the United States 
with that of other countries, the Court found that the “overwhelming weight of 
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty . . . provide[s] 
respected and significant confirmation” for the decision that the juvenile death 
penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.147 
 
 139. Id. at 556–57. 
 140. Id. at 556. 
 141. Id. at 558. 
 142. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (2003).  The Missouri Supreme Court 
stated that despite the holding in Stanford, a national consensus disapproving of the execution of 
juvenile offenders had since developed.  Id. at 399.  The court also noted that “the views of the 
international community have consistently grown in opposition to the death penalty for 
juveniles.”  Id. at 411. 
 143. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551. 
 144. Id. at 564–67. 
 145. Id. at 564–75. 
 146. Id. at 575. 
 147. Id. at 578. 
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The Court’s analysis accounted for the fact that only eight nations had 
exercised the death penalty against a juvenile since 1990.148  Of these, the 
Court emphasized that every nation except the United States had either banned 
the death penalty for juveniles or shown disapproval for such executions.149  
The Court remarked: “In sum, it is fair to say that the United States now stands 
alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty.”150  
The majority defended its use of foreign law, noting that while global 
normative practices and opinions were not dispositive, they did play an 
important confirmatory role in the Court’s decision.151 
Justice O’Connor dissented in Roper, finding that there was no domestic 
consensus against the juvenile death penalty, but agreed that the Court’s use of 
foreign materials served a confirmatory role in Eighth Amendment analysis.152  
Noting that the Court regularly included references to foreign opinion in 
Eighth Amendment decisions, Justice O’Connor wrote: 
This inquiry reflects the special character of the Eighth Amendment, which, as 
the Court has long held, draws its meaning directly from the maturing values 
of civilized society. . . . [T]his Nation’s evolving understanding of human 
dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, 
the values prevailing in other countries.153 
Despite her defense of the use of foreign sources, Justice O’Connor 
acknowledged that the only role foreign opinion can play in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence is a confirmatory one.154 
 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, provided a scathing dissent criticizing the 
Court’s holding and the majority’s reliance on foreign legal sources.155  Noting 
that foreign opinion is not binding on the Court, Justice Scalia argued that “the 
basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to 
the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”156  The 
dissent argued that no justification could be found for the inclusion of foreign 
law in the reasoned opinion of a constitutional issue.157  Justice Scalia argued 
 
 148. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577.  The nations cited by the Court were: China, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Yemen.  Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 578.  “It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to 
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and 
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of 
freedom.”  Id. 
 152. Id. at 604–05 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 153. Roper, 543 U.S. at 604–05. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. at 607–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 624. 
 157. Id. 
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that this view, similarly expressed in Stanford, Lawrence, and Atkins, remained 
valid even in light of Trop.158 
Essentially, the dissent viewed the Court’s opinion as disregarding the 
reality of the domestic attitude about the juvenile death penalty159 and accused 
the majority of casting its members’ own personal views about the juvenile 
death penalty into the law by means of foreign legal sources.160 
To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it 
otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry. . . . What these 
foreign sources “affirm,” rather than repudiate, is the Justices’ own notion of 
how the world ought to be, and their diktat that it shall be so henceforth in 
America. . . . “Acknowledgement” of foreign approval has no place in the legal 
opinion of this Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s judgment—
which is surely what it parades as today.161 
Thus, Justice Scalia was not only unconvinced that foreign law should play a 
role in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, he was also unimpressed with what 
he viewed as the majority’s inclusion of such materials under the guise of a 
merely confirmatory role.162  
Of course, the portion of Justice Scalia’s statement that guesses at the 
motives of his fellow Justices is outside the focus of this Comment.  However, 
Justice Scalia’s conclusion that foreign law must have played some role in the 
decision is certainly relevant here.163 Professor Ernest Young argues 
persuasively that the finding of a national consensus against the juvenile death 
penalty in Roper was dubious and that the Court included international opinion 
as part of the consensus-building pool to make its holding persuasive.164  As a 
 
 158. Roper, 543 U.S. at 611–14, 621. 
 159. Id. at 622.  “Though the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the 
Court’s decision today, the views of other countries and their so-called international community 
take center stage.”  Id. 
 160. Id. at 628. 
 161. Id. at 627–28 (emphasis in original). 
 162. Id. 
 163. The Roper majority did not deny this point, but instead attempted to marginalize its 
importance by referring to its use of foreign sources as merely confirmatory.  See Roper, 543 U.S. 
at 578 (majority opinion) (“The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our 
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”).  
Though dissenting, Justice O’Connor supported the use of foreign law in a confirmatory role.  Id. 
at 605 (O’Connor dissenting) (“At least, the existence of an international consensus of this nature 
can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus.  The 
instant case presents no such domestic consensus, however, and the recent emergence of an 
otherwise global consensus does not alter that basic fact.”). 
 164. Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 
(2005). 
  Including foreign practice shifts the question from whether places like Texas and 
Missouri—states maintaining the juvenile death penalty—are unusual out of the fifty-one 
American jurisdictions, to whether those states are unusual considered against the world 
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result, this Comment joins the recognition that the Court did rely on foreign 
sources and argues that in its reliance on these sources, the Court’s decision 
damaged democratic discourse. 
III.  THE USE OF FOREIGN LAW IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT DECISIONS 
UNDERMINES THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 
As one might expect, the dialogue between the Justices in these cases has 
fueled the recent explosion of debate regarding the place of foreign law in the 
Court’s decisions.165  So far, whenever the Court has invoked foreign opinion 
in its reasoning, it has taken time to note that the use of these sources is not 
dispositive.166  However, the Court’s language walks a shaky line between 
mere “confirmatory” use of foreign laws and actual persuasive value.  Thus, 
Justice Scalia’s discussion of the use of these sources raises valid concerns, 
and Americans have started to pay attention.  In keeping with this recent 
upsurge of interest in the role of foreign sources, this Comment argues that the 
use of foreign sources in Eighth Amendment decisions undermines important 
and necessary democratic principles. 
As previously noted, whenever the Court makes a determination on a legal 
issue, the holding curtails discussion of that issue in the public sphere to some 
extent.167 This is much more the case when the Court hands down 
constitutional prohibitions.  For instance, with the decision to ban the juvenile 
death penalty in Roper, the Court effectively removed any substantive 
discussion of the juvenile death penalty from the public sphere.  Debating and 
 
as a whole (or perhaps some subset of countries with values similar to our own).  The 
foreign jurisdictions, in other words, swell the denominator against which the set of 
jurisdictions retaining the benighted practice is measured. 
  The point of swelling the denominator is that it is not big enough without these 
foreign practices. . . . Such an even split [among Americans] hardly fits the common 
understanding of “consensus” as “[g]eneral agreement or concord” or “the collective 
unanimous opinion of a number of persons.”  This substantial minority position on the 
domestic plane becomes an aberrational practice, however, when judged against the 
backdrop of world opinion. 
Id. at 153–54. 
 165. See supra notes 5, 6, and 8 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78 (majority opinion) (calling foreign opinion “not 
controlling” but “instructive” authority that provides “respected and significant confirmation”); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (stating that foreign sources “are by no means 
dispositive, [but] their consistency with the legislative evidence lends further support to our 
conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have addressed the issue.”).  But see 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Our cases recognize 
that objective indicators of contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in other 
countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis.”). 
 167. See QUIRK & BRIDWELL, supra note 14, at 8 (discussing Alexander Bickel’s view that 
“[t]he Court’s decision necessarily cuts off public debate and the possibility of achieving a 
democratic consensus.”). 
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exploring the issue among opposing viewpoints is futile because the Court has 
determined the policy issue once and for all. 
The Court’s decision in Roper is a one-way ratchet—there will be no more 
hopeful debates about the truth of the juvenile death penalty because the Court 
has already made a final determination.  Even if there is a sudden influx of 
seventeen-year-old murderers and citizens would prefer to re-impose the death 
penalty, the states would be powerless to do so in the face of Roper.  In fact, 
some states apparently do prefer to allow the death penalty as an option for 
minors, as twenty states allowed juvenile executions at the time of Roper.168  
However, while disagreement on the issue remains, proponents and opponents 
of the ban have little or no incentive to continue discussing the matter in the 
public sphere. 
With discussion of the merits of retaining the juvenile death penalty 
removed from the public sphere, opponents of the ruling have nowhere to take 
their position, and engagement of the issue can no longer occur on a significant 
level.  Most disturbing is the recognition that to the extent that foreign opinion 
contributed to this determination, the American public has been deprived of the 
ability to better itself with a thoughtful and thorough engagement of the 
issue.169 
This point may initially seem overblown, but a closer look indicates that 
constitutional decisions influenced in whole or in part by foreign legal sources 
deprive American society of the possibility of resolving the issue by 
developing a real consensus on truth.  Even if the juvenile death penalty is just, 
society is deprived of the opportunity to arrive at this understanding, thereby 
bypassing an important principle embodied in the Judicial Branch itself—a full 
and proper understanding of justice.  Conversely, even if the juvenile death 
penalty is unjust, pre-emption of that discussion hinders social progress by 
circumventing American citizens’ recognition of that fact.170  Whereas Mill 
and Habermas argue that, over time, an argument should mature in such a way 
that the weight of one position so clearly refutes the other that it becomes 
accepted, this process cannot occur when the topic is de-thematized. 
 
 168. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.  The Court noted that the same calculation existed in Atkins v. 
Virginia, although the trend towards abolition of the death penalty for the mentally retarded was 
substantially more extreme than for the juvenile death penalty.  Id. 
 169. The deprivation of the ability to better ourselves derives from the notion that it is more 
beneficial if society actually agrees that the juvenile death penalty is wrong than if the Court bars 
the death penalty’s imposition while a large percentage of the population still supports it. 
 170. Of course, this assumes that the morality of the juvenile death penalty remains an open 
question.  While convincing arguments can be made that the juvenile death penalty is morally 
illegitimate, for the purposes of this Comment, it is sufficient to note that the question remains an 
open one in American society.  At the time of Roper, twenty of thirty-eight states that employed 
the death penalty also retained the juvenile death penalty.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
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A. The Growth and Nature of Foreign Law’s Influence in Eighth Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
One important question is to what extent the Court actually relies on 
foreign law in its decisions.  The Court has repeatedly asserted that foreign law 
merely plays a confirmatory role in its decisions and is not treated as binding 
authority.171 However, the recent expansion of the use of these sources 
indicates that foreign law may play a greater role than some claim.  In Trop, 
the discussion was limited to a short paragraph.172  Coker173 and Enmund174 
both limited the discussion to footnotes, and Thompson’s discussion of foreign 
sources was confined to a brief paragraph.175  Even Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Stanford limited its criticism of foreign opinion as a resource for 
constitutional interpretation to a footnote.176 
In Roper v. Simmons, however, the Court painstakingly recounted the state 
of foreign law on the juvenile death penalty over three pages in a section 
separate from the rest of the opinion.177  This considerable expansion appears 
indicative of a greater willingness by the Court to use foreign law as a 
determinative factor, rather than merely confining it to a confirmatory role as 
the Roper majority claimed.178  This appearance is not merely a function of the 
length of the Court’s treatment; the discussion in Roper is the most thorough, 
considered, and serious examination of foreign law in any Eighth Amendment 
case.179 
What seems somewhat paradoxical is why the Court cites these sources at 
all if they carry no actual weight in its decision.  In fact, Justice Scalia raised 
this very point in a debate with Justice Breyer in early 2005.180  Showing 
concern for what he sees as selective citation of foreign law by certain Justices 
only when it agrees with their personal views, Justice Scalia stated: 
Do you want it to be authoritative?  I doubt whether anybody would say, “Yes, 
we want to be governed by the views of foreigners.”  Well if you don’t want it 
 
 171. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (“The opinion of the world community, while not 
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own 
conclusions.”) (emphasis added). 
 172. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958). 
 173. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977). 
 174. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982). 
 175. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988). 
 176. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989). 
 177. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005). 
 178. Consistent with this pattern is the considerable length of discussion given to foreign 
sources by the majority in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 179. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78. 
 180. Scalia & Breyer, supra note 6. 
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to be authoritative, then what is the criterion for citing it [or] not?  That it 
agrees with you?  I don’t know any other criterion to bring forward.181 
Justice Breyer responded to the criticism by noting that while foreign opinions 
are not binding, judges in other nations have dealt with similar questions of 
law, and American judges can learn about the U.S. Constitution by reading 
their opinions.182  Even so, the actual discussion and citation of foreign law in 
the decisions tends to indicate that these sources hold some perceived authority 
beyond mere confirmatory or informative value.  Thus, while the growing use 
of foreign legal sources in Supreme Court decisions does not certainly indicate 
that the Court is using foreign law as a determinative factor—after all, the 
opinions do provide at least some domestic support for their holdings in all of 
these cases—the growing presence of foreign sources does create the 
impression that the Court finds them instructive and accords some weight to 
them. 
Nonetheless, a number of scholars have found the “confirmatory role” 
explanation persuasive.  For instance, Professor Vicki Jackson argues that 
foreign law has played such a role since at least 1879.183  She suggests that in 
referencing foreign sources, jurists 
do not treat foreign or international material as binding, or as presumptively to 
be followed.  But neither do they put on blinders that exclude foreign legal 
sources and experience.  Transnational sources are seen as interlocutors, 
offering a way of testing understanding of one’s own traditions and 
possibilities by examining them in the reflections of others’.184 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.  Professor Young does not think the decision in Roper reflects Justice Breyer’s 
interest in learning from other judges, because the Court simply counted foreign jurisdictions that 
barred the juvenile death penalty; the Court did not investigate the rationales behind these 
decisions in any foreign jurisdiction.  Young, supra note 164, at 152, 155. 
The Court might feel strongly based on its own moral reasoning, that the juvenile death 
penalty is immoral but be unwilling to override democratic processes unless it finds its 
intuitions shared by a large majority of respected legislators and jurists.  This majority 
does not exist, of course, until the foreign jurisdictions are counted.  Foreign practice thus 
“persuades” the Court, but it is persuasion of a particular kind.  The Court is not 
persuaded by new rationales, but rather by the mere fact that foreign jurisdictions take a 
particular view.  It has not “learned” anything from looking abroad other than to find out 
that others agree with what the Court already believed.  It is deferring to numbers, not 
reasons. 
Id. at 155. 
 183. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005). 
 184. Id. at 114. 
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According to Professor Jackson, consideration of foreign legal materials in an 
“interlocutory framework” merely “prompt[s] deeper reflection on whether 
current interpretations live up to our own constitutional commitments.”185   
Despite this noble model of comparative constitutional analysis, Professor 
Jackson’s view appears to treat this approach as truth-neutral—an analysis that 
occurs “without a thumb on the scale in either direction, permitting more 
differentiated influences . . . in an interlocutory framework.”186  However, 
Professor Jackson fails to note that all relevant information has some 
persuasive value, and the examination and use of such information necessarily 
do lead toward one direction or another.  This is the nature of information 
sharing—examination of other possibilities and viewpoints requires one to be 
self-critical of one’s own position.  This process necessarily involves the 
prospect of persuasion.  For this reason, the Court’s thorough examination of 
foreign law in cases such as Roper appears to include a persuasive component. 
When a court engages in a “confirmatory” analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment, it essentially asks: “Are we right about this moral judgment?”  
The argument made in this Comment is that in doing so courts ask an 
unnecessary and inappropriate question.  Courts applying the Trop standard 
should ask: “What moral judgment has a consensus of Americans reached?”  
This is the extent of the constitutional inquiry.  A court’s analysis of foreign 
law is unnecessary because such an analysis has nothing to do with the national 
consensus.  It is improper because, by its inquiry into foreign law, a court 
abandons its role as an arbiter of the law and becomes an arbiter of morality.  
Such judgments should be left up to the democratic process, which is fully 
capable of placing moral norms into a legal framework via the Legislative and 
Executive Branches.  The next section explains how the inclusion of foreign 
legal materials as persuasive authority in constitutional law prevents robust 
democratic development. 
B. The Use of Foreign Law as a Mechanism to Circumvent the Democratic 
Process 
As it is the role of judges is to ensure that the laws of the United States 
comply with the Constitution, it is logical to conclude that constitutional 
decisions are domestic concerns with legal implications for the citizens of the 
United States, who are granted rights by that document.  As exemplified by the 
line of Eighth Amendment cases discussed above, the Court’s ability to define 
 
 185. Id. at 127; see also Yitzchok Segal, Comment, The Death Penalty and the Debate Over 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Citation of Foreign and International Law, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1421, 1432, 1442 (2006) (arguing that foreign law’s “confirmatory role” is evident because while 
case law has held national consensus to trump contrary foreign opinion, the inverse is not true: 
“[C]ontrary comparative legal materials cannot trump the national consensus.”). 
 186. Jackson, supra note 183, at 124. 
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and give meaning to terms within the Constitution is one of great importance 
for American liberty and self-governance.  Therefore, when the Supreme Court 
considers whether an American law comports to the United States 
Constitution, the principles considered logically should be American in 
nature.187  As Justice Scalia explained: 
[W]e judges of the American democracies are servants of our peoples, sworn 
to apply, without fear or favor, the laws that those peoples deem appropriate.  
We are not some international priesthood empowered to impose upon our free 
and independent citizens supra-national values that contradict their own.  If 
“international norms” had controlled our forefathers, democracy would never 
have been born here in the Americas.188 
In light of this principle, it is difficult to see any logical relationship between 
American constitutional law and the views of other nations, specifically as they 
pertain to Eighth Amendment considerations.189 
Moreover, as explained by Mill, Habermas, and a host of others, social 
norms and political ideologies that drive policy determinations develop within 
public opinion over time.190  This process occurs via discussion, consideration, 
and ultimately, acceptance of the best argument available in the “marketplace 
of ideas.”191  The interaction of individuals within the public sphere facilitates 
the accommodation of new ideas via the thematization of topics, followed by 
give-and-take discussion and continued growth of conflicting positions until 
the strength of an argument prevails and is deemed accepted as truth within 
that society.192 
 
 187. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868–69 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are 
expounding.”). 
 188. Scalia, supra note 125, at 1122. 
 189. In fact, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the citation to foreign law creates other problems 
for self-governance: 
[J]udges of course are not accountable to the people, but we are appointed through a 
process that allows for participation of the electorate, the President who nominates judges 
is obviously accountable to the people.  The Senators who confirm judges are accountable 
to the people.  In that way the role of the judge is consistent with the democratic theory.  
If we’re relying on a decision from a German judge about what our Constitution means, 
no President accountable to the people appointed that judge, and no Senate accountable to 
the people confirmed that judge, and yet he’s playing a role in shaping a law that binds the 
people in this country. 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 200–01 (2005) (testimony of 
John G. Roberts, nominee for Chief Justice of the United States). 
 190. See supra Part I. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
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Judicial use of foreign law does not necessarily prevent this process 
outright.  However, if foreign law plays a persuasive role in constitutional 
determination, its use pre-empts at least part of an important discussion that 
should take place within this country.  To be sure, Court decisions always pre-
empt public discussion of the issues they address to some extent.193  Generally 
pre-emption is a non-issue as citizens expect the “truth” of the Constitution’s 
meaning to be discerned by the Court in a manner that does not involve any 
appeal to the public sphere.194 
The difference with the Eighth Amendment is that it is consensus-based.195  
As such, the Trop standard directly gives import to the state of the present 
discussion of an Eighth Amendment issue in the public sphere.196  The Court’s 
attention to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society”197 requires an examination of the debate as it has been 
resolved in the states.198  To the extent that the discourse has achieved 
consensus in any one state, the Court can certainly further the democratic 
process by giving weight to that determination.  Additionally, the Court should 
give weight to the fact that in some states, the discussion continues and may 
have some distance to cross before something resembling consensus is 
reached.  When the Court relies upon these mechanisms for gauging the 
progress of American society, democracy is not circumvented. 
However, the ongoing democratic process in those places where consensus 
has yet to occur is severely disrupted if the Court inserts the views of foreign 
nations—some of which may not have “evolved” via democratic inclusive 
discourse.  If the Court uses foreign opinion as a persuasive factor in the 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, the judiciary runs the risk of 
supplanting the development of ideas in the public sphere with the views of the 
world community.  While such a view is certainly appealing to opponents of 
the death penalty when focused on the end result, it undermines the democratic 
principles that have nourished American society for over two centuries. 
The democratic process is best served when the discussion results in 
political action at the state level, where a consensus can be formed and 
implemented through the election of officials who will examine the will of the 
people and enact laws in the legislature that comport with their will.  Until this 
occurs, it is in the best interests of democracy for the Court to stand aside, at 
 
 193. See QUIRK & BRIDWELL, supra note 14, at 8. 
 194. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 195. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78, 564 (2005) (applying the Trop standard 
and noting that “[t]he beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus”). 
 196. See id. 
 197. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 198. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (requiring a review for consensus “as expressed in particular 
by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.”). 
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least as regards the Eighth Amendment, so that the public may cultivate the 
dialogue and arrive at a collective agreement.199 
Proponents of foreign sources ignore the possibility that international law 
and opinion may be better utilized in the public sphere than in the courtroom.  
There is no reason that foreign practices cannot provoke reflection on our 
constitutional traditions in the political process.  If foreign approaches to law 
and morality are truly persuasive, the democratic political process is well-
equipped to assess them as such and integrate them into statutory or 
constitutional law.200 
Finally, in that the Eighth Amendment Trop standard is concerned with the 
growth of society,201 it is more beneficial to the evolution of these standards if 
the populace is allowed to engage in discussion and reach an agreement on the 
issue before outlawing it.  As the death penalty goes, if we are to determine as 
a society that its imposition is unjust, then it is better that there be a collective 
decision not to execute the offenders than to allow a panel of judges to tie the 
hands of the executioner in avoidance of the social discussion.  If this model is 
followed with regard to the Eighth Amendment, the Court will not interfere 
with the potential for social progress, and the public will have real potential to 
improve itself overall. 
C. Possible Responses to Curb the Use of Foreign Legal Sources 
In light of the conclusion that the use of foreign law creates undesirable 
results, not the least of which is to curb democratic debate on a variety of 
controversial and important social issues, it is important to consider ways in 
which the tendency to appeal to foreign sources might be limited or eliminated 
altogether. 
 
 199. Unfortunately, the Court did not take this approach in Roper.  As Professor Young notes, 
[I]n Roper . . . [t]he national political branches had not, in fact, sat passively by as the rest 
of the world staked out positions on the juvenile death penalty.  The Court, however, gave 
these political branch decisions the back of the hand. . . . The national political branches 
had plainly determined that the world’s condemnation should not affect our own domestic 
law.  But the Court adopted precisely the opposite course. 
Young, supra note 164, at 164–65. 
 200. Whether the persuasive value of foreign opinion is better suited for consideration by the 
judiciary or the public may depend on the extent to which one trusts the citizenry’s competence to 
consider complex issues, comprehend them, and take effective action through the political 
process.  Those who distrust the ability of the public to intellectualize political, moral, and legal 
principles may prefer to leave such decisions to a more “sophisticated” judiciary.  Justice Scalia 
argues against this cynicism: “We are not some international priesthood empowered to impose 
upon our free and independent citizens supra-national values that contradict their own.”  Scalia, 
supra note 125, at 1122. 
 201. See supra Parts II.A., II.C. 
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1. Congressional Action 
A number of attempts have been made in Congress during recent years to 
discourage federal judges and Supreme Court Justices in particular from 
utilizing foreign law in their decisions.202  These attempts include everything 
from prohibiting the use of foreign sources in constitutional decisions 
altogether203 to simply recommending that such sources not be used.204  While 
the commitment of members of Congress to maintaining the integrity of 
constitutional jurisprudence is admirable, a congressional mandate on how the 
Supreme Court should decide cases would be an overextension of 
congressional power.205 
In order for each branch of government to be effective within the system of 
“checks and balances,” Congress should not restrain the Court’s ability to 
make judicial determinations as it sees fit.206  If Congress could mandate how 
 
 202. See H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005) (indicating a non-binding preference among 
members of the House of Representatives that foreign sources not be used to inform the meaning 
of the Constitution); S. Res. 2323, 108th Cong. (2004) (prohibiting the citation of foreign sources 
and allowing impeachment for breach of good behavior if such citations occur); H.R. Res. 3799, 
108th Cong. (2004) (same); H.R. Res. 446, 108th Cong. (2003) (recommending that Justices not 
cite to foreign sources); H.R. Res. 468, 108th Cong. (2003) (same, but singling out Justices 
Kennedy, Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg as favoring the citation of foreign law). 
 203. H.R. Res. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 204. H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 205. Congressional power to interfere with the Court’s activities is not thoroughly addressed 
in the Constitution.  However, the lack of discussion in the text does suggest that such authority is 
limited to circumscribing the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.  In all the 
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as 
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make. 
U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.  In other words, the Constitution gives Congress the power to determine 
what cases the Court can hear, but does not give the power to direct how the Court can decide 
those cases.  In United States v. Klein, the Court declared invalid a statute that required the Court 
to dismiss claims where the loyalty of the claimant depended upon presidential pardons.  80 U.S. 
128 (1871).  The Court reasoned that congressional action infringed upon the judicial power: 
Can we [dismiss such cases] without allowing that the legislature may prescribe rules of 
decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it?  We 
think not . . . . Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative 
from the judicial power. 
Id. at 146–47. 
 206. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174–80 (1803); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 261 
(James Madison) (Bantam ed. 1982) (“To what expedient then shall we finally resort for 
maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid 
down in the constitution?  The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior 
provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior 
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the Court should rule on a particular issue, the Court’s role as an arbiter of the 
law would be greatly diminished, if not eliminated altogether.207 
Thus, as well-meaning as Congress may be in its attempts to pass laws and 
resolutions about the methodology of judicial interpretation, such actions 
would inadvertently circumvent the judiciary’s constitutional function as a 
check on the legislature.208  Such methods ought not be employed where they 
lead to results that threaten the purpose of the Judicial Branch.209 
2. Action by the Executive 
Another possible mechanism for the limitation of the use of foreign legal 
sources by the judiciary is through the executive’s appointment of Justices who 
will refrain from appealing to foreign documents.  However, executive action 
can likely only have limited success, as Supreme Court appointments are 
relatively rare and vacancies come at uncertain times.210 Moreover, a 
 
structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be 
the means of keeping each other in their proper places.”). 
 207. Another issue that has been raised by Congress is whether the citation to foreign law is a 
violation of a Justice’s oath and good behavior, warranting removal from the bench.  See U.S. 
CONST. art III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices 
during good Behaviour”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be 
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
292–93 (2005) (questions of Sen. Tom Coburn, Member, S. Comm. on Judiciary) (stating that he 
believed citation to foreign law to be a violation of the oath taken by Justices, which does not 
constitute good behavior).  Chief Justice Roberts stated in his confirmation hearing that he did not 
believe the citation of foreign law constituted a breach of the oath: 
I don’t think [the citation of foreign law is] a good approach.  I wouldn’t accuse judges or 
Justices who disagree with that, though, of violating their oath.  I’d accuse them of getting 
it wrong on that point, and I’d hope to sit down with them and debate it and reason about 
it.  I think that Justices who reach a contrary result on those questions are operating in 
good faith and trying, as I do on the court I am on now, to live up to that oath that you 
read. 
Id. at 293 (testimony of John G. Roberts, nominee for Chief Justice of the United States). 
 208. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial 
Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75 (positing that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress 
the power to facilitate the judiciary’s powers, but intrinsically limits Congress’s authority in that 
the Clause does not allow the Legislature to interfere with or subvert judicial independence); 
Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 
CONST. COMMENT. 191 (2001) (arguing from an originalist point of view that the Constitution 
does not allow Congress to dictate how the Court decides cases); Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s 
First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525 (1998) (reading Klein as denying 
Congress the ability to require the Court to act against its best judgment in the judicial process). 
 209. “It is equally evident, that [no branch of government] ought to possess directly or 
indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their respective 
powers.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 250 (James Madison) (Bantam ed. 1982). 
 210. Consider the vacancy left in 2005 by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s death, coupled with 
Justice O’Connor’s retirement. 
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prospective Justice’s stance on foreign law is only one jurisprudential issue 
that should be considered when making appointments.  Ultimately, the use of 
foreign law is only one issue in a broad array of other issues, and its import in 
the appointment process is only part of the equation. 
Another problem with seeking reform through the executive is that as 
human beings, judges are not entirely predictable.211  Therefore, even if the 
executive expects to appoint a certain “type” of judge, the President cannot be 
expected to forecast how a particular judge will rule over time and in what 
manner the methodology of a judge might change.  Thus, reliance on the 
executive to ensure that foreign opinion plays no role in constitutional 
decisions is an ineffective remedy. 
3. Criticism in the Public Sphere 
A possible way for the public to participate in the eradication of foreign 
law from Supreme Court opinions is at the ballot box.212  In other words, when 
voting for a presidential candidate, voters can consider the type of judge that 
candidate might appoint to the Supreme Court.213  Votes can then be cast for 
candidates most likely to appoint judges who would refrain from citing foreign 
sources.  But while the populace ought to consider a candidate’s potential 
appointments to the Supreme Court, there are a plethora of other issues that 
must also be accounted for, and the people cannot be expected to ignore all 
other issues for the sake of the judiciary’s use of foreign law.  Additionally, the 
intent behind such an approach would appear results-oriented and politically 
motivated rather than methodologically focused.  To that extent, judicial 
 
 211. See Linda P. Campbell, Justice White: The Democrat Who Often Votes with Court 
Conservatives, CHI. TRIB., March 21, 1993, at C18 (examining Justice White’s tendency to vote 
with Court conservatives, though he was expected to be judicially liberal); Edward Lazarus, 
Boomerang Justices—Ouch!, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2005, at M1 (providing a summary of judges 
who have not voted on the Court as their nominating Presidents expected); Todd S. Purdum, A 
Justice Not Like the Others, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at A24 (noting that Justice White “often 
emerged as a conservative force” even though he was appointed by a Democratic president); 
David G. Savage & Richard B. Schmitt, Who May Succeed Rehnquist, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 
2005, at A1 (stating that although Justice Souter was expected to be judicially conservative, he 
has “voted regularly with the [C]ourt’s liberal bloc.”); Jeffrey Toobin, Advice and Dissent: The 
Fight Over the President’s Judicial Nominations, NEW YORKER, May 26, 2003, at 42 (noting 
disappointment by Republicans when “[Justice] Souter turned out to be a moderate-to-liberal 
Justice” rather than the conservative jurist they had expected). 
 212. Indeed, considerations pertaining to the viewpoints of potential appointees to the federal 
bench already exist in regard to another controversial issue: abortion.  See Jan Crawford 
Greenburg & Naftali Bendavid, Rehnquist Illness Puts High Court in Spotlight, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 
26, 2004, at 1 (discussing the likely importance of Supreme Court appointments to voters 
concerned with abortion). 
 213. Id. 
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criticism at the ballot box may not be especially beneficial to the legal 
institution. 
However, the public can effectively oppose the use of foreign citations in 
another way.  Following the notion presented above that debate in the 
“marketplace of ideas” results in reaching truth on an issue,214 an effective 
mechanism for removing foreign law from constitutional decisions is via 
public discourse.  In fact, this has already gone on through the thematization of 
the issue discussed in newspapers, this Comment, and others like it.215  
Continued examination of the use of various sources in the Court’s opinions 
over time should lead to pointed arguments on both sides, ultimately resulting 
in the acceptance of one view by a vast majority of scholars and concerned 
citizens.  Thus, a consensus on the issue may be reached so that society at large 
favors a methodology that refuses to give weight to foreign opinion when 
interpreting the United States Constitution. 
As long as a real discussion of methodology and theoretical constitutional 
law can occur in the public sphere, citizens will elucidate and expound upon 
important insights on the role of foreign law.216  In the process, a general 
agreement should be reached over time so that the issue of reliance on foreign 
sources in constitutional decisions can resolve itself.  As judges are selected 
from this populace, the result of the discussion would ideally result in the 
appointment of Justices who will not incorporate foreign views into the Court’s 
decisions because they, like the public at large, believe that it undermines core 
democratic principles.  Indeed, if democratic discourse is able to resolve issues 
in the manner suggested above, such a process may be successful in combating 
the problem. 
4. Judicial Criticism and Ongoing Academic Discussion 
Because it could take a long time for the public to reach a consensus, 
perhaps the best people to lead the discussion in the immediate are those whom 
the question of methodology most directly impacts; the judges themselves.  In 
fact, this process is already taking place in dissenting opinions and other 
commentary produced by judges.217  A vibrant discussion in the judicial sphere 
might very well yield results among current judges similar to what can be 
expected later in the public sphere.  Indeed, results here might be more 
pronounced because the quality of discourse and the persuasiveness of the 
 
 214. Supra Part I. 
 215. See supra notes 5, 6, and 8. 
 216. See supra Part I. 
 217. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (including debate between majority 
and dissent over the role of foreign law; discussed supra Part II.C.); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003) (including a similar debate to that in Roper); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(same; discussed supra Part II.B.). 
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arguments are likely to improve more rapidly when the issue is undertaken by 
scholars and experts on constitutional interpretation. 
In addition to the Court’s opinions, American judges have already engaged 
in the debate over foreign law in recent years in speeches and law journal 
articles.218  As noted above, Justices Scalia and Breyer participated in a debate 
at American University over the role of foreign law.219  Additionally, Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and O’Connor have given speeches at the American Society 
of International Law supporting the use of foreign sources in Supreme Court 
opinions and advocating continued exploration of the issue.220 Taking a 
moderate approach, Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain of the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals recently spoke in London and noted that while foreign legal sources 
may have beneficial effects in American jurisprudence, courts should take “a 
cautious approach to comparative constitutionalism.”221 
Outside the Supreme Court, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has been 
one of the most outspoken critics of the use of foreign law in domestic 
constitutional decisions.222  In particular, Judge Posner has noted that citing 
foreign law involves various risks, including allowing the political stances of 
judges to inadvertently creep into opinions, undermining democratic notions of 
 
 218. See Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law (Apr. 2003), in 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2003) (supporting 
consideration of foreign law in constitutional jurisprudence, and noting five ways that 
consideration of such sources has had a “growing impact on [his] professional life”); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative 
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law (Mar. 31–Apr. 2, 2005), in 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
351 (2005) (supporting the growth of comparative analysis in constitutional law); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of A Comparative Perspective in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 329 (finding great value in judicial 
consideration of international law: “We are the losers if we do not both share our experience with, 
and learn from others.”); Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348 
(2002) (noting the benefit comparative legal analysis can have in American jurisprudence); 
O’Scannlain, supra note 8 (providing cautious support for the use of foreign law in American 
jurisprudence); Posner, supra note 8 (disapproving of recent uses of foreign law in Supreme 
Court decisions); Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote 
Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 2, 2004), in 
98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305 (2004) (arguing that while foreign legal sources may be 
instructive in certain rare cases, foreign law is never relevant to interpreting the meaning of the 
Constitution); Scalia & Breyer, supra note 6 (debating the merits of relying on foreign law in 
constitutional decisions); see also Robert H. Bork, Travesty Time Again, NAT’L REV., March 28, 
2005, at 17–18 (criticizing the use of foreign and international opinion in Roper as a “dazzling 
combination of lawlessness and moral presumption”). 
 219. Scalia & Breyer, supra note 6. 
 220. Breyer, supra note 218; Ginsburg, supra note 218; O’Connor, supra note 218. 
 221. O’Scannlain, supra note 8, at 1907–08. 
 222. Posner, supra note 8. 
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self-governance, and incorporating authorities into American law without a 
thorough understanding of the legal structures where foreign legal opinions are 
produced.223 Likewise, former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork has 
criticized the Court’s use of foreign law as a move toward allowing 
international opinion to mold the Constitution.224  Additionally, legal scholars 
have grappled with the debate in recent years, with much disagreement about 
the proper role of foreign law, if any, in constitutional decision-making.225 
The increasing amount of literature from scholars and judges alike is 
promising in that it suggests an ongoing discussion of the issue is taking place 
whereby the issue might be resolved in the nature of Habermas’s notion of 
democratic truth-finding.  The quality of the debate among jurists and scholars 
can only be a positive force in the gradual resolution of this issue in American 
jurisprudence.  It is to this body of legal scholarship that this Comment humbly 
attempts a contribution. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Supreme Court’s decisions are integral to the preservation of 
American liberty, it is important to examine the tools used by the Court to 
ensure that those tools do not hinder American democracy.  If nothing else, 
when dealing with consensus-based precedents, such as that in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, it is important that the Court incorporates 
democratic ideals into its consideration.  Looking to foreign opinion for a 
determination of what constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” oversteps 
that boundary.  If this trend continues, it may lead to an atmosphere where 
convincing a majority of one’s fellow citizens is no longer the way to achieve 
social change; instead one may only need to convince five Supreme Court 
Justices that the rest of the world has provided an answer. 
But no matter how we, the public, decide to approach the issue, the goal 
must be a more robust democratic conversation.  Perhaps, then, all four of the 
above-mentioned approaches have a place in the gradual determination of what 
 
 223. Id. at 84–90. 
 224. Bork, supra note 218, at 17–18. 
 225. See Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization”: 
Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic 
Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1298–1327 (arguing that the use of foreign 
law might be relevant for purposes of predicting whether a new rule of law will be effective, or 
explaining differences between legal systems, but not for the purpose of determining moral facts 
relevant to the Constitution); David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 
(2005) (suggesting in part that the American Constitution is unavoidably influenced by foreign 
law because there is overlap and reciprocity in various legal systems); McGinnis, supra note 8 
(arguing that foreign law allows judges to place their personal views in their decisions, 
undermines principles of self-governance, and reduces the diversity of political approaches in the 
world). 
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role foreign law has in American domestic constitutional decisions, if any.  
Even in the legislature’s overtures against the use of foreign law and attempted 
mandates, a communication occurs with the public.  In this way issues are 
thematized and thrown into the realm of public discourse for closer 
examination. 
There is little doubt that when Senators Tom Coburn and Jon Kyl recently 
commented on Chief Justice Roberts’s views on the use of foreign law at his 
confirmation hearings that they were communicating to both the Court and 
their constituents their own personal views as well.226  Open and conscientious 
discussion on any issue is good for American society.227  However, while the 
citation of foreign sources seems to run contrary to democratic principles, it is 
important that the discussion of their use not be prematurely interrupted.  After 
all, one can hardly claim to support discourse as a method of truth-finding 
while simultaneously imposing a prohibition on others before a meaningful 
consensus is reached.  It is this author’s hope that when the issue is ultimately 
resolved, democratic principles will prevail and the use of foreign law as a 
basis for Eighth Amendment decision-making will become a thing of the past. 
DAVID J. PFEFFER 
 
 226. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 292–93 (2005) 
(questions of Sen. Tom Coburn, Member, S. Comm. on Judiciary) (stating that he believed 
citation to foreign law to be a violation of the oath taken by Justices and a breach of good 
behavior); Id. at 199–200 (questions of Sen. Jon Kyl, Member, S. Comm. on Judiciary) (stating 
that he believed citation to foreign law had no place in domestic constitutional decisions). 
 227. See supra Part I. 
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